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Note
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADOPTION AGENCY DECISIONS
Adoption agency consent is a prerequisite to court approval of
adoption petitions in many jurisdictions, by virtue of either express
statutory language or judicial interpretation. Since the courts in these
states have no power to review agency denials of approval, the
agencies are left with final, unsupervised control over the last stage
of the adoption process. After criticizing the various rationales that
have led to this result, the author discusses the theoretical and
practical reasons for giving adoption petitioners the opportunity to
challenge agency decisions in court.
I. INTRODUCTION
FROM A PROCESS dating to ancient times designed to provide anheir,' adoption has evolved into a major program in the care of
unwanted and orphaned children and today affects the lives of a
large number of people each year. 2 The increase in the numbers
of children involved has vastly expanded the role of the adoption
agency, with results that are not entirely satisfactory. Extensive
1. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. Rn-v.
743, 745 (1956). Adoption was unknown at English common law, so until
about 1850 Louisiana and Texas, with their civil law backgrounds, were the
only jurisdictions allowing formal adoption. Id. at 747. The other states be-
gan to pass adoption statutes during the latter part of the eighteenth century
and were inspired from the start by humanitarian concern for orphaned chil-
dren. Id. at 749. See also Kuhlmann, Interstate Succession By and From the
Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943).
2. Adoptions increased from 96,000 in 1958 to 175,000 in 1970. Com-
ment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 CoRNELL
L. REv. 780, 781-82 n.10 (1970); WELFARE, SOCIAL AND REHABIUTATivE SERV-
ICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN 1971, at 1 (1972). The indications are,
however, that the number of adoptions is now decreasing because of the drop
in the supply of desired children. WELFARE, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERv-
ICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION, AND WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN 1971, at 1 (1973). Legalization of abor-
tion, increased use of birth control, and the trend toward unwed mothers keep-
ing their children are among the prime factors creating this situation. Bar-
bour, It Took Them Four Years to be Instant Parents, Miami Herald, Mar.
17, 1974, at 9-F, col. 1.
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coverage by the media of several notorious decisions s and of the
black market for babies4 has resulted in a public awareness that
is conducive to a reevaluation and reordering of the interrela-
tion of the courts and the agencies in the adoption process. One
of the most critical elements to be examined is the extent to which
adoption agencies dominate5 the process. The agencies contend
that by virtue of their expertise, they are best qualified to make the
final decision whether to approve an adoption. Some courts have
taken the position that as the forum granted subject matter jurisdic-
tion over adoption by statute6 and as impartial observers, they
should be the final arbiters. The importance of resolving this con-
flict is accentuated by the expanded role that the agencies now
play7 and by -the efforts agencies are making to become the only le-
gal conduit through which children can be adopted.8
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 46, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1972,
at 46, col. 4; NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1972, at 118; LiFE, June 11, 1971, at 34-
36.
4. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 4; Barbour, supra note 2.
5. Adoption agencies are of two varieties: the public agencies, which are
run by the state, usually through the Department of Public Welfare, and the
private agencies, which are run by religious or nonsectarian charitable organi-
zations.
6. The court-granted jurisdiction over adoption matters varies from state
to state. In a few states, courts of general jurisdiction have authority. E.g.,
CAL. Civ. CODE § 226 (Cum. Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.102 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The more usual
pattern places jurisdiction in a specialized court such as the probate court. E.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. P.A. 73-156 (App. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 710.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Omo R v. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Page 1972).
Less frequent is the establishment of special juvenile or domestic relations
courts. E.g., COLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 (1964).
7. In 1958, there were 27,000 agency placement adoptions and by 1970
this number had increased to 69,600. Comment, A Reconsideration of the Re-
ligious Element in Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 780, 781-82 n.10 (1970);
ADOPTONS IN 1970, supra note 2, at 1. Agencies are a necessary part of the
adoption process even when they are not custodians of the child. Often they
conduct investigations of prospective parents for courts when courts assume
custody. H. CLARK, DomsTc RELATIONS 616-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].
8. Hauser, Adoption and Religious Control, 54 A.B.A.J. 771, 773 (1968).
In a majority of states, adoption may be effected either through agency or pri-
vate placement. In agency placement, the child is placed with a family that
has been carefully screened and approved by the agency. Under the private
placement method, the natural and adoptive parents, often working in conjunc-
tion with a lawyer or doctor, place the child directly. A number of adoptions
take place entirely within the family of the child. The parents place the child
with other family members, or relatives take the child when the parents die.
These adoptions generally produce little dissent, and in some states there are
more expeditious procedures for these adoptions. CLARK 638-40.
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The adoption process begins when an agency acquires custody
of a child through either the natural parents' voluntary release of
the child to a designated agency or the judicial commitment of the
child to an agency. The agency then seeks to place the child in a
suitable adoptive home. The prospective parents, after a specified
period of time set by statute, file a petition with the appropriate court
to have the adoption decreed. It is at this stage of the process
that the issue of authority must be resolved: Is agency consent a
prerequisite to the judicial granting of an adoption petition? A
necessary corollary to this question is whether a court is permitted
to undertake a de novo investigation of the facts upon which the
initial agency determination is based.
Although the question of judicial review of rejected adoption pe-
titions has arisen in diverse circumstances, two particular fact sit-
uations appear with great regularity. In the first situation, the
agency decides a particular placement is not advantageous after
the child has been living on a conditional basis with the prospective
adoptive parents for a time.9 The second common fact pattern oc-
curs when foster parents who initially assumed custody with no
thoughts of permanent adoption become attached to the child after
having had custody of the child for a considerable period.10 In
9. It is difficult to isolate the factors that may convince an adoption
agency that a family conditionally accepted as adoptive parents is not "right"
for the child. The caseworker may discover new data about the child or about
the prospective parents which places a new light on the adoption. Investiga-
tion of the parents is an ongoing process during the placement period.
Changes in the family situation of the candidate parents, such as death or mar-
ital discord, are closely scrutinized. Moreover, particular care is exercised by
the agency when the placement involves an infant.
10. Whether to permit foster parents to adopt at all is a particularly trou-
blesome area of adoption. There are several additional variables to consider
where there has not been an unconditional release of custody to the agency
that placed the child in the foster home. The natural parents may withhold
their consent to release the child for adoption, or the child may develop some
actual handicap or suspected handicap during his tenure with the foster parents.
Pearlman, Foster Parent Rights in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. RFv. 36, 37-38
(1972). Quite naturally the emotional attachments between foster parents and
the child develop in the period of custody. Thus, a long placement puts both
the foster parents and the child in an extremely vulnerable position. The fos-
ter parents are expected to provide a normal homelife for the foster child and
yet to be willing to surrender the child upon short notice. Katz, Legal Aspects
of Foster Care, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 283, 301 (1971). For the foster parent, such
a separation is, of course, traumatic. For the child, the adjustment is more
difficult. The child's conduct follows a predictable pattern, moving from pro-
test to despair and finally to detachment, a phenomenon child psychologists re-
fer to as the Bowley-Patterson syndrome. Pearlman, supra at 38-39.
[Vol. 25:650
1975] ADOPTION 653
both cases the prospective parents, in an effort to keep the child,
file the petition for adoption in the face of agency opposition.
11. THE STATUTES
An examination of the availability of judicial review of agency
decisions necessarily begins by focusing on statutory law since no
formal adoption process existed at common law."' Adoption stat-
utes that deal with authority over the adoption process are of three
basic types. There is no difficulty with interpretation of the first
group of statutes, which expressly provide for judicial review of
agency determinations or review upon agency disapproval (effec-
tively the same for most purposes). 12  Problems have arisen, how-
When the foster parents are not suitable parents, the decision not to grant
the adoption petition is, of course, justifiable. However, at times the decision
to reject the petition of foster parents is made solely because it is felt that the
foster parents have used the foster-parent program to bootstrap their way to
permanent adoption, since foster parents generally do not meet the strict re-
quirements established by the agency for the purpose of screening applicants
for adoptive parents. But by virtue of the length of time they have the child
in their home, and the emotional bond formed in that period, foster parents
build a substantial case in their favor. Since subsequent separation may cause
trauma, approval of the adoption petition by the agency or court is consistent
with the child's emotional welfare. See Note, The Rights of Foster Parents
to the Children in Their Care, 50 CH.-KENT L. REV. 86, 97 (1973).
Nevertheless, allowing large numbers of people to circumvent the adoption
procedure by becoming foster parents could subvert the entire foster-parent pro-
gram. Agencies might refuse to use foster homes if the foster-parent program
were consistently used to evade the qualifications established by the agencies.
See In re Adoption of Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 120 n.2, 346 P.2d 672, 673
n.1 (1959). Contra, Mary I. v. Sisters of Mercy, 200 Misc. 115, 104 N.Y.S.2d
939 (Sup. Ct. 1951). The result of such a trend would be the continued insti-
tutionalization of the children.
Legislation reflects the tensions between the two views. In New York, fos-
ter parents who have held custody of a child for a period of 2 years or more
are granted certain privileges when they file adoption petitions. N.Y. DoM.
R L. LAw § 111(4) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1974). California reflects the
opposite position, granting preferences to the non-foster-parent applicant over
the foster parent. CAL. Civ. CODE § 224n (West Cum. Supp. 1974); see In
re Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct. App.
1969). Comment, The Foster Parent Dilemma "Who Can I Turn to When
Somebody Needs Me?", 11 SAN DrEEo L. REv. 376, 394-406 (1974), contains
a more complete treatment of the contrasting approaches to the foster-parent
program.
11. CLARK 603.
12. A number of states now have provisions expressly allowing the courts
to dispense with agency consent upon either hearing or consideration of writ-
ten reasons for disapproval. Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106(A)(3), (C)
(1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 905 (Cum. Supp. 1970); HAwAnI REV. STAT.
tit. 31, §§ 578-2(a)(3), (b)(6) (Supp. 1974); Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 199.473
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ever, with the other two groups. The second group provides that
an adoption agency "may consent to a petition.' 3 The plain mean-
(2) (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74 (Michie 1973); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 210, § 2A(E) (1958); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-26(F) (Supp. 1973);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-06(h) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 411, 413
(Cum. Supp. 1974); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 16.05 (1975); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-225 (Cum. Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(5)
(Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.85 (Cun. Supp. 1974); cf. CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 224n (West Cum. Supp. 1974), which provides that agency determinations
on the applications of adoptive parents who are not foster parents may be re-
viewed and overturned by the courts, construed in Adoption of McDonald, 43
Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 453.020-.030 (Cum.
Supp. 1975), makes no reference to agency consent but does state that in all
cases court approval is required. Furthermore, in a later section, § 453.070(2),
it is provided that foster parents who have had the child for 18 months are
entitled to preference from the agency in adopting the child but final discretion
is in the court.
It should be noted that providing for judicial review by statute does not
necessarily mean the courts will liberally reverse agency determinations. Mal-
pass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 192 S.E.2d 794 (1972), has placed a very strict
interpretation on the court's power to dispense with consent. In this case the
mother had remarried and her new husband was attempting to adopt her son
by a former marriage. The natural father, who had been granted visitation
rights under the divorce decree, had maintained a relationship with the child
and refused to consent to the adoption. The fact that it was the natural parent
refusing consent doubtless had some effect on the court's outlook. But speak-
ing generally about the statute, the court held that a finding alone that the
child's best interests lay with the adoption was not enough to justify waiving
consent. The court reasoned that otherwise the section granting judicial review
to determine the best interests would make the consent provisions, which in-
clude one applicable to agencies, irrelevant and that the legislature could not
have intended that result. Id. at 393, 192 S.E.2d at 798.
13. ORE. Rv. STAT. fit. 11, §§ 109.316(1), (2) (1973): "(1) The Chil-
dren's Services Division or an approved child-caring agency of this state, acting
in loco parentis, may consent to the adoption of a child."
Other states with statutes that merely empower the agency to consent with-
out making clear whether that consent is essential are the following: ALA.
CODE tit. 27, § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-106, -120
(1971); CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. P.A. 73-156, § 10 (App. 1974); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (the Maine statute is peculiar
in that it states "shall consent" when the child has been committed to the
agency and "may consent" when the child has been released to the agency by
his parents); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(1)(f) (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §
93-17-5 (1972); NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 11, § 127.050 (1973); S.D. CoMPiLED
LA Ws ANN. § 26-6-21 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-3-1 (Cum. Supp.
1974). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.081(1) (1969):
(1) . ..but if the child has previously been permanently com-
mitted to a licensed child-placing agency or the state department of
public welfare, the consent of the parent or parents or legal guardian
is not required and the consent may be given by the licensed child-
placing agency or the state department of public welfare to which the
child has been so committed and this consent is sufficient.
Louisiana's adoption statute, LA. REv. STAT. § 9:422 (1965), makes no men-
tion of the issue of agency consent.
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ing doctrine' 4 offers little assistance in the effort to establish a
predictable standard. The response of some courts, therefore, has
been to resort to legislative intent. Not surprisingly, the results have
been varied. Other courts have concluded that the mechanical use
of the rules of statutory construction dictates that agency consent be
a prerequisite to the approval of an adoption petition. 15 Still others
have examined the nature of the adoption process and have implied
a judicial prerogative to review agency decisions.16
The third group of statutes presents no obvious need to look be-
yond the mandatory words of the statute. This group primarily
states that the agency "shall consent" or its consent "shall be filed"
with a court before the judicial approval of an adoption petition
may proceed. 17 For the most part, courts have accepted the statu-
tory language as controlling, often with unpopular results.' 8 In
certain instances, however, courts have refused to follow legisla-
tive directives and have effectively amended the statutes in ques-
tion to permit judicial approval of adoption decrees in the absence
of agency consent.19
14. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01
(4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
15. E.g., In re Adoption of Matthew, 4 Ore. App. 308, 477 P.2d 235
(1970).
16. E.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 24 Conn. Super. 76, 80, 186 A.2d 811, 814
(1962); In re Adoption by Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.020(5) (Cum. Supp. 1973); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 4-1-6(1), (2)(h) (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(4) (1973); IDAHo
CODE § 16-1504 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-
Hurd 1974); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-120(a) (3) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1972); IowA
CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Cum. Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2102(5) (Cum.
Supp. 1972); MicE COMP. I.ws ANN. H9 710.3(b), (c), (e) (Cum. Supp.
1974); MoNT. RFv. CODEs ANN. § 61-205(4) (1970); NEB. REv. STAT. §
43.105(1), (2) (1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5(I)(f) (Supp. 1973);
NJ. STAT. ANN. tit. 9:3-23 (1960); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9(a)(1), (3); 48-9.1 (Cum. Supp.
1974); Oino RFv. CoDE ANN. § 3107.06 (Page 1972); OELA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 60.5(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 9H 15-7-6 to -7-7
(Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7(d) (Cum. Supp. 1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-113 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1973); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 99 435(5), (6), (7) (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-710.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
18. In re St. John, 51 Misc. 2d 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Family Ct. 1966);
In re Adoption of Wyatt, 40 Ohio Misc. 47, 210 N.E.2d 925 (P. Ct. 1965).
19. In the case of In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 478
(1972), petitioners originally obtained custody of the child through a foster-
parent program since they were over the age limits set by the agency for adop-
tive parents. Age, then, was the reason for the disapproval of the petition by
the agency. The child, when originally given to the petitioners, was suffering
19751
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A. Statutory Construction
The obvious starting point in the analysis of the meaning of any
statute is the language of the 'statute itself. It is within this context
that courts have often used the traditional rules of statutory interpre-
tation to find agency consent mandatory in adoption proceedings.
The plain meaning rule, 20 for example, is particularly effective to
assert the necessity of agency consent when a statute sets forth such
consent as an express prerequisite to the approval of an adoption pe-
from a serious neurological disorder, but under their care progressed to the
point where she was considered a normal healthy child. The court found that
the child's progress would be jeopardized were the decision of the agency to
be given effect. Faced with these circumstances the court looked past the
words of the Ohio statute and granted the adoption petition. This result was
later followed under less compelling circumstances by Ohio's highest court in
State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers, 38 Ohio St. 144, 311
N.E.2d 6 (1974). The case of In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d
27 (1967), also appears to overrule the mandatory wording of the applicable
statute. The situation was so drastic, however as to suggest that the holding
would not go beyond the fact pattern. In that case, the child in question was
illegitimate; its natural parents had lived together for an extended period during
which the child and its father formed a rather deep relationship. The mother
took the child with her when domestic difficulties arose. The father expended
a considerable amount of money and energy to find the child and succeeded
only after the child had already been turned over to an agency by the mother
and placed with adoptive parents. The father then sued for and obtained cus-
tody of the child. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision.
It is important to resolve the issues involved in judicial review of agency
decisions because a number of states still await a judicial ruling on the issue.
The currently confused state of the law on both "may consent" and "shall con-
sent" types of statutes generates an unfortunate uncertainty as to the result
when the statutes are construed on this point. Those statutes of the "may con-
sent" type that have not been construed include the following: ALA. CODE tit.
27, § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. P.A. 73-156, § 10 (App.
1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 11, § 127.050
(1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Those statutes of
the "shall consent" type include: ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.020(5) (Cum. Supp.
1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-1-6(1), (2)(b) (1963); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-403(4) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 3-120(a)(3) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2102
(5) (Cum. Supp. 1972); MONT. Rnv. CODES ANN. § 61-205(4) (1970); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 43.105(1), (2) (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5(I)(f)
Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9:3-23 (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9
(a)(1), (3); 48-9.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 15-7-6 to
-7 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7(d) (Cum. Supp. 1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-113 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1973); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 435(5), (6), (7) (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-710.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); 2A SuTH-
ERLAND § 46.01.
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tition. For a court that adopts this approach, the judicial role,
even when confronted with a difficult fact situation, is limited to
denying judicial review and in some .cases commiserating with the
parties and advocating legislative change. For example, in the
case of In re St. lohn,21 a New York county welfare department
denied an adoption petition because the petitioners, who had orig-
inally been granted custody of the child on a foster parent basis,
were over the age limits set by the agency. Another justification
offered by the agency was that the child was fair-skinned and fair-
haired and the petitioners were dark-skinned. The evidence dis-
closed that the child had lived with the petitioners for all but a few
days of her life and had been given the best of care. Upon peti-
tion, the Family Court of Ulster County refused to weigh these
facts and the additional possibility of pyschological trauma for the
child if separated from petitioners. The court focused solely on the
words of the statute, decided that the only relevant fact was the
agency disapproval, and denied review.22
In St. John, the policy of judicial restraint ultimately produced
a change in the law: In response to the decision and the public
furor it aroused, the New York legislature rewrote a part of the
adoption statute. The new provisions give foster parents first pref-
ference if the child has been living with them more than two years
and vest in the court the power to review agency disapproval of an
adoption submitted by foster parents. 28  However, even in cases
such as this or when outright judicial lobbying is successful, the
change is time-consuming. In the interim, technical readings of
statutory language continue to produce inequitable results. In re
Sherman,24 a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, illustrates
this fact. In Sherman, the court stepped in as parens patiae to
protect an abused child from his parents. After terminating all par-
ental rights, the court committed the child to an agency for adop-
tion. However, once the agency assumed custody from the natural
parents, the court washed its hands of the entire matter and held
that it retained no power over the child's future-even in the
event that the adoption agency were to to act unreasonably in re-
21. 51 Misc. 2d 96, 100, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 824 (Family Ct.), rev'd on
other grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 980, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1966).
22. 51 Misc. 2d 96, 112-14, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 834-36 (Family Ct. 1966).
23. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE L&w § 374(1-a) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1973).
The statute which covers non-foster parent petitions is N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 111 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1974).
24. 241 Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 573 (1954).
1975']
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jecting an adoption petition. Since it was the concern for the
child's welfare in providing a stable, safe family environment that
led the court to assume jurisdiction in the first instance, it seems in-
consistent for the court to withdraw abruptly upon the entrance of
the agency into the picture when it is still possible that the desired
result might not have been obtained.
Some courts, however, have refused to reach the conclusions
called for by a literal reading of jurisdictional statutes and have de-
fied the clear terms of statutes. 25  Reasoning that no statutory
language should be so construed as to lead to unreasonable results, 26
these courts have concluded that no rule of statutory construction
can be justified apart from the consequences of its application.
When the circumstances for approving an adoption have been com-
pelling, some courts have held that they cannot be ignored for the
sake of absolute adherence to a rule of construction.
Another rule of statutory interpretation that appears to call for
a strict requirement of agency consent is that statutes in derogation
of common law are to be strictly construed.27 As one court has put
it, "[b]eing of purely statutory origin, a legal adoption results if the
procedure is followed, but fails if any essential requirements of the
statute are not complied with .... ,,28 Several state courts have
adopted this approach and have required agency consent for judi-
cial jurisdiction when the statute was of the ambiguous "may con-
sent" type,20 a view which extends the strict construction rule much
further than its intended scope. The basic flaw in this argument is
that adoption has no history in the common law.30 Thus, broadly
25. The Ohio experience is illustrative of the effects of judicial impatience
with unrealistic statutes. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
26. E.g., In re Adoption by Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App.
1968); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.E.2d 27 (1964); In re Haun,
31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 478 (1972). See generally Commissioner
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); 2A SUTHERLAND § 45.12.
27. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952). But see 2A SUTHER-
LAND § 61.04.
28. Blue v. Boisvert, 143 Me. 173, 178, 57 A.2d 498, 501 (1948).
29. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (Cum. Supp. 1974), construed in
Blue v. Boisvert, 143 Me. 173, 181, 57 A.2d 498, 502 (1948); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.24(1) (f) (1971), construed in In re Sherman, 241 Minn. 447, 63
N.W.2d 573 (1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.316(1), (2) (1973), construed in
In re Adoption of Matthew, 4 Ore. App. 308, 477 P.2d 235 (1970).
30. Adoption was unknown at English common law although it existed in
Roman law. Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955). The court in McKinzie went so far as to state that adoption is repug-
nant to the common law.
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construing agency consent requirements for adoption cannot be in
derogation of any common law precepts. Indeed, the only common
law rule that relates to the adoption of children is that the natural
parents' rights to their child are sacrosanct.31 Adoption statutes rec-
ognize this fact but with several qualifications. By allowing the
transfer of children to adoptive parents these statutes are in dero-
gation of common law only because they compromise the rights of
the natural parents. Thus, if anything, adoption statutes should be
strictly construed in favor of the parent, 32 not in favor of the adop-
tion agency, which is a creature of statutory law with no common
law origins. This rubric, therefore, offers little assistance to the
view that agency consent is a prerequisite for judicial jurisdiction
of agency decisions.
B. Agency Consent as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
Some courts holding that the consent of an adoption agency is
essential to consideration of an adoption petition have looked to the
rationale that if the child's custodian does not consent, there is no
jurisdiction to act on the petition. 33 The jurisdictional approach,
however, is not based on any single concept and embraces a num-
ber of arguments. The Iowa Supreme Court in In re Adoption of
Cheney34 founded its jurisdiction-based decision to deny an adop-
tion petition on the nature and history of adoption prior to the ad-
vent of the agencies: "We believe our present adoption statutes still
contemplate and are based on the principle of consent by some one
having legal custody." 35  Before the wide acceptance of adoption
and the creation of agencies, the parents and relatives were the
Prior to the statutory change in Texas in favor of judicial review, the Texas
courts relied upon the strict construction argument to buttress their jurisdic-
tional arguments. Lutheran Social Serv., Inc. v. Farris, 483 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1972).
31. ' The transfer of the natural rights of the parents to their children was
against its policy and repugnant to its principles." Driggers v. Tolley, 219 S.C.
31, 36, 64 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1951).
32. Id.; In re Adoption of Rule, 435 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
33. "Consent of the required parties . . . is jurisdictional." In re Stem,
2 111. App. 2d 311, 314, 120 N.E.2d 62, 64 (1954); see Ellis v. Woods, 214
Ga. 105, 103 S.E.2d 297 (1958); In re Adoption of Thornton, 184 Kan. 551,
337 P.2d 1027 (1959); In re Adoption of Simpson, 203 Ore. 472, 280 P.2d
368 (1955).
34. 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953).
35. Id. at 1186, 59 N.W.2d at 688.
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parties directly involved who gave the requisite consent. The Iowa
court assumed ,that ,the same considerations that made parental con-
sent mandatory made agency consent equally necessary.3 6
The reasoning in Cheney represents one variant of the most
popular jurisdictional argument: the doctrine of in loco parentis.37
In loco parentis is essentially a jurisdictional argument in that it
analogizes agency consent to the parental consent that is generally
required to give the court jurisdiction when the parents have cus-
tody. In other words, the agency stands "in the place of the par-
ent" of the child and, because parental consent is essential in the
case of natural parents releasing a child for adoption, so too, is
agency consent essential where the agency holds custody prior to
the adoption. By obtaining the consent of the natural parents to
assume custody of the child, as required by law, the agency as-
sumes the position of the parents and becomes the only party quali-
fied to give consent to further transfer of custody.38
One need not look to veiled judicial references to identify the
in loco parentis rationale. The adoption statute of Oregon specifi-
cally mentions the need for consent in terms of the doctrine.3 9
Moreover, the doctrine of in loco parentis pervades even those
states whose adoption statutes make no reference to the issue of ju-
dicial review. The Texas Supreme Court in reviewing its statute
which made no reference to judicial review40 (until a 1974 amend-
ment) stated: "[A]fter parental consent for placement is given the
child-placing agency stands in loco parentis to the child and is
clothed with authority to give or withhold the consent necessary to
entry of a judgment for adoption." 41
36. Id. at 1180, 59 N.W.2d at 685.
37. In re David, 256 A.2d 583 (Me. 1969); Lutheran Social Serv., Inc.
v. Farris, 483 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); In re Adoption of Matthew,
4 Ore. App. 308, 477 P.2d 235 (1970).
38. As one court has stated the premise, the states have "substitute[d] the
consent of the agency to the adoption for the consent of the parent." In re
David, 256 A.2d 583, 586 (Me. 1969).
39. ORE. RaV. STAT. tit. 11, § 109.316(1) (1973), provides in pertinent
part, "The Children's Service Division or an approved child-caring agency of
this state, acting in loco parentis, may consent to the adoption of a
child ......
40. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 16.05 (1973).
41. Catholic Charities v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 24-25, 337 S.W.2d 111,
113 (1960). Other cases under the old statute reached a similar result:
Wilde v. Buchanan, 303 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.), reh. denied, 157 Tex.
606, 305 S.W.2d 778 (1957); Pearce v. Harris, 134 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940).
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Although the simplicity of a rationale that simply replaces par-
ental consent with agency consent is attractive, 42 the justification
for requiring consent in the former situation is not applicable to the
latter. The reasons for requiring parental consent to adoption fo-
cus on the importance our society places on the parent-child rela-
tionship and are jealously guarded by the courts, which have con-
sistently affirmed the uniqueness of the family bond. 'In State ex
rel. Ashcroft v. Jenson,43 the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, "Or-
dinarily parents are entitled to the custody of their child. Every
court recognizes the deep and enduring affection which parents have
for their children and their willingness to make sacrifices and endure
hardships in their interests which a stranger would not consider. 44
Because the surrendering of one's child for adoption severs this
relationship completely and permanently, the circumstances under
which parental consent is given must be closely scrutinized. Since
the parent frequently relinquishes the child for adoption during a
period of severe stress, such as after the birth of an illegitimate
child or in the midst of a serious financial crisis, the requirement
of formal consent ensures the parents time for reflection on the seri-
ousness and finality of the action. It also provides a buffer against
those who would take advantage of the parents' vulnerability. The
"desperate straits" rationale is not the only justification for requiring
parental consent. Even if the parent is not under any particular
stress, the giving up of one's child is a most serious undertaking and
that fact should be formally impressed upon the parent.
There is another reason for ensuring that the parent is freely and
knowingly surrendering his child: formal consent protects the
adopting parents from later claims by natural parents who undergo
a change of heart. All of these considerations are apparent to the
42. The popularity of the in loco parentis approach is demonstrated by its
many theoretical spinoffs. One commentator has theorized, for example, that
agency consent is a necessary prerequisite of an adoption petition because the
agency is presumed to act in the best interests of the child. The agency, there-
fore, makes the decision the child would make, were he competent to make
the decision-a sort of "in loco pueri' approach. Merrill, Toward Uniformity
in Adoption, 40 IowA L. Rnv. 299, 304 (1955); see In re Adoption of Mat-
thew, 4 Ore. App. 308, 312, 477 P.2d 235, 237 (1970).
43. 214 Minn. 193, 7 N.W.2d 393 (1943).
44. Id. at 195, 7 N.W.2d at 394-95. This same court has even implied
that the "natural affection between the parents and the offspring" is a right
"possessing constitutional dignity . . . as much as . . . the protection of the
rights of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness .... "
State ex reL Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 547-48, 75 N.W.2d 786, 794
(1956).
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judiciary; as a result there is an institutionalized hesitancy to rule
against the parents, based on the judicial presumption that children
are better left with their natural parents. 45 The foregoing consider-
ations do not apply to agency consent to an adoption petition. For
the entire period during which an agency has custody of the child,
its primary goal is to effect an adoption. The parental bond does
not linger; it has already been severed either by court order or
by the consent form that the parents executed upon releasing the
child to the agency. Agencies accept children temporarily until,
hopefully, an adoption can be arranged; the surrender of custody
is the desired result of the agency-child relationship. None of the
protective considerations relevant when the natural parents have
custody are present. This fact has been expressly recognized by
the California Supreme Court in Adoption of McDonald.
The consent of these public agencies, or of a licensed pri-
vate agency, cannot be equated with parental consent. The
right of the natural parent to refuse consent is based on the
natural affection between parent and child. . . . Mani-
festly 'the same "natural and sacred rights" are not present
when a child has been relinquished to an agency for
adoption. At most the agency acquires . . . the legal
custody of the child. 46
In loco parentis, therefore, fails because no adoption agency can
realistically form the same interest in a child as a natural parent.
However, the reasons for attacking it extend beyond the basis of
the theory into its legal effects. First, in loco parentis by its terms
purports to state that the adoption agency is standing in the place
of the parent. In practical effect, however, the doctrine elevates
the adoption agency to a position above that of the parent. 47 Al-
though parents are presumed to be the ones best equipped to deal
with their children,48 the presumption is rebuttable; parental rights
can be subordinated when a court believes that the circumstances
merit an intrusion into the family situation. However, the absolute
requirement of agency consent before judicial review makes the
agency's decision final. This situation is most clearly illustrated in
states where the pertinent legislative standard for acting on adop-
tion petitions is the best interest of the child.49 In such states, if
45. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 149-50, 154 N.W.2d 27, 41 (1967).
46. 43 Cal. 2d 447, 459, 274 P.2d 860, 867 (1954).
47. In re Adoption by Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
48. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 149, 154 N.W.2d 27, 41 (1967).
49. E.g., ORE. Rav. STAT. § 109.316(1) (1973).
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parental rights may be subordinated for specified misconduct that
threatens the child's interests, it is untenable that the agency rejec-
tion be unreviewable even if that decision jeopardizes the child's
best interests.
Another objection to in loco parentis lies in its underlying as-
sumption that an adoption agency is best suited to represent the in-
terests of the child.50 This notion failed to take into account the
conflict of interests that may be created in the adoption process.
To say that an agency is free to dedicate itself totally to the interests
of another party is to ignore the fact that the agency itself has sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of an adoption proceeding. When
people ask a court to accept an adoption petition without the
consent of the agency, they are attacking the agency's judgment
and, in many cases, the agency regulations upon which the decision
was based. Thus, when a petition has been disapproved, it is un-
realistic to suppose that the interests of the agency and the child
are identical. The agency's interest in protecting its own status
may prevent it from advocating what is in fact best for the welfare
of. the child.
Formulating the jurisdictional argument in terms of in loco pa-
rentis conceals the fact that denying judicial review upon agency dis-
approval results in the complete absence of judicial scrutiny. If the
custodian's denial of consent blocks judicial review, then only when
the agency approves will the court look into the facts of the peti-
tion. By and large, however, these petitions meet with no opposi-
tion and there is no motivation for the courts to question the proc-
esses leading to approval. If there is any challenge to the pro-
ceeding it would be by the natural parents or the child, and the fo-
cal point of this opposition would probably be the original surren-
der of the child, not subsequent agency actions.
Thus, the in loco parentis justification for requiring agency con-
sent is inconsistent with the reality of the agency-child relationship,
affords the agency even greater insulation from court action than
natural parents are afforded, veils the prime interests of the adop-
tion agency, and, once stripped to its essentials, robs the court of
any meaningful opportunity to explore the agency's decision.
C. The Position of 1he Advocates of Judicial Review
The rationales used by the courts to justify the finding that the
50. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
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judiciary does not have the power to review agency decisions have
serious flaws. Arguments based on the textbook rules of statutory
construction that lead to a finding of mandatory agency consent can
be countered with rules of interpretation that are equally sound.
Moreover, arguments that agency consent is a prerequisite of judicial
review are circular. Finally, the in loco parentis rationale cannot be
reconciled with the independent interests of adoption agencies. It is
upon these flaws then, that the advocates of judicial review build
their case.
The view that agency consent is a jurisdictional prerequisite
has always been subject to judicial criticism.51 However, many
of the courts that have decided in favor of judicial review have
occupied themselves with the substantive problems of the children
and adoptive parents before them, apparently dismissing the juris-
dictional arguments summarily. 52 The jurisdictional theory survives
in many states only because it has not been expressly discredited.
There are, though, strong arguments against allowing an agency to
monopolize the adoption process under statutes that appear to
call for agency consent.
One of the strongest possible reasons for not regarding agency
consent as a jurisdictional prerequisite is that statutes that deal spe-
cifically with the question are not jurisdictional in nature but in-
tended merely to set forth the formalities of the process. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court in dealing with a statute of the "may con-
sent" 53 variety aptly presents the argument: '"n short, the con-
sent of the guardian is not jurisdictional, but is only one of the
ways to dispense with the parent's consent. . . . The jurisdiction of
the Probate Court to act in adoption cases is not dependent on the
willingness of the Welfare Director, as guardian of the minors, to
consent to the proceedings. ' 54  The crux of this argument is that
the bounds of judicial jurisdictions are set out in the general jurisdic-
tion sections of adoption statutes-those that establish the compe-
tency of particular courts to adjudicate matters pertaining to adop-
tion. Other specific statutory provisions, therefore, should not be
51. See In re Meyer's Estate, 197 Ore. 520, 254 P.2d 227 (1953).
52. See Ratcliffe v. Williams, 220 Ark. 807, 250 S.W.2d 330 (1952); In
re Adoption by Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); In re Mark
T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 143, 154 N.W.2d 27, 37 (1967); In re Sherman, 241
Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 573 (1954); In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286
N.E.2d 478 (1972).
53. See note 9 supra.
54. Ratcliffe v. Williams, 220 Ark. 807, 809, 250 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1952).
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permitted to restrict the scope of subject matter jurisdiction. This
approach is followed in the Ohio case of State ex rel. Portage County
Welfare Department v. Summers.55
We conclude that such deprivation of authority [denying
judicial review] would not only be anomalous but would
constitute an impermissible invasion of the Probate Court's
power to act in areas in which the court is specifically
vested by statute with authority to perform its judicial
power granted by the Constitution. Therefore, R.C.
3107.06(D) may not operate to divest the Probate Court
of its necessary judicial power to fully hear and determine
an adoption proceeding. To hold otherwise would leave
the fate of the adoptive child ito agency whim or caprice
without having the agency's reasons for denying consent
adjudicated. 56
This view significantly reduces the impact of adoption agency
decisions yet it does not appear to thwart the purpose of the agency
system as originally contemplated. Since the role of adoption agen-
cies is primarily to place children in suitable environments, the
agencies should be recognized in the eyes. of the law more as
conduits than independent centers of power. Making their consent
the controlling factor in the adoption process is inconsistent with this
status since it effectively usurps the power of the state delegated to
the courts in the general jurisdictional statutes. 57
Another, less formalistic, argument for the interposition of judi-
cial review of adoption agency determinations used by some courts
dictates that questions arising in the context of adoption be disposed
of in an equitable manner. The embodiment of the inherently
equitable nature of adoption is the standard of "best interests of the
child," which most courts use in dealing with adoption and related
issues.
The initial step in reaching an application of the best-interests
test to the merits, for those courts acting under a statute that does
not expressly mandate review, is frequently to invoke the power of
the court to adjudicate, on behalf of the state, rights and interests
in which the state has an interest. The power of the state to pro-
vide for those unable to care for themselves derives from the doc-
trine of parens patiae.58 Because of the clear relevance of the
doctrine to the condition of children and the flexibility of courts of
55. 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 311 N:E.2d 6 (1974).
56. Id. at 152, 311 N.E.2d at 11.
57. Ratcliffe v. Williams, 220 Ark. 807, 809, 250 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1952).
58. CLARx 572.
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equity in handling matters akin to custody, parens patriae became
a justification for chancery to exert its power to care for distressed
children. Because of the continuing oversight of courts of equity
over complaints brought to their attention the courts seem particu-
larly well equipped to handle the problem of ongoing custody con-
tests. Equity will not tolerate attempts to secure its ouster from
jurisdiction.59 Once a dispute is brought before the court, it will
be entertained until the problem is brought to the desired resolu-
ition: "[C]hancery's power concerning the welfare of legitimate and
illegitimate children does not disappear upon the release of the
child for adoption." 60  Although parens patriae developed when
adoption was unknown as a method of child care, there is no ap-
parent reason why it should not be expanded,to cover it.
The attractiveness of a parens patriae approach is that it in-
vokes all the flexibility inherent in equitable procedures. Technical
requirements of jurisdiction are subordinated to the rights of inter-
ested parties because equity will not permit the form of the trans-
action to prevail over its substance.61 Having invoked notions of
the power of the state and parens patriae to justify accepting juris-
diction, the courts analyze the merits of the case on the basis
of the best interests of the child.62  Authority for the best-interests
standard is usually found in a reading of statutory purpose: "The
main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of
children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real
parents, by the legal recognition and regulation of the consummation
of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent
and child."63
The equitable nature of the parens patriae and best-interests
approach is an effective tool for courts dealing with statutes that do
59. Cf. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 74 N.J.
Eq. 457, 71 A. 153 (1908).
60. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 143, 154 N.W.2d 27, 37 (1967).
61. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1962); En-
glestein v. Mackie, 35 Ill. App. 2d 276, 182 N.E.2d 351 (1962). One com-
mentator discussing In re Adoption by Alexander, states that the "Department
argued the case principally on the technical legal issues of contract and proce-
dural law." The petitioners convinced the court by arguing the underlying hu-
manitarian issues. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 283,
298 (1971).
62. E.g., In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.E.2d 27 (1964); In re
Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 478 (1972).
,63. Adoption of Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 377, 354 P.2d 18, 22, 6 Cal.
Rpti. 562, 566 (1969).
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not expressly empower the courts to review because it allows them to
look at the whole adoption process, which is essentially humanitarian.
The gravamen of this approach is simply that the letter of the
law should not be interpreted so as to violate its spirit.64 Adoption
statutes were, after all, passed primarily to encourage the adoption
of homeless children by deserving individuals.65 The trust of the
agencies in this regard is a critical one; they must ensure that the
petitioners are, in fact, deserving. However, there must be checks
on their power to protect against arbitrary denials. Without con-
straints, "agency consent becomes superior to all other considera-
tions." 6   Such a development thwarts the statutory purpose by as-
signing to the agency process a significance apart from the results
it produces.67  Deference to agency expertise is essential, but con-
cession of state power is extremely undesirable.
As courts cannot be content to follow the legal conclusions of
agencies, neither can they blindly accept the intermediate factual
conclusions. This is not to imply that the agency will intentionally
err in its findings of fact or that the court itself is infallible, but
rather to indicate that the rights and interests involved are of such
importance that all the parties should have the opportunity to be
heard in a neutral forum. A de novo hearing insures that the adop-
tion process will retain its equitable nature, a necessity for any in-
quiry into the best interests of the individual. Speaking to the flexi-
bility required in an adoption proceeding, one court has stated:
"Such proceedings are equitable in nature. In fact, because of the
bearing they have on the entire course of the life of the child, they
are sometimes said to be equitable in the highest degree .... -68
The best way to resolve the question of the significance of
agency determinations in the context of the flexible equitable proce-
dure is to give agencies a role commensurate with their subordinate
status. Thus the agency grant or denial of consent should possess
evidentiary rather than conclusive force. This change would
make agency action but one of many elements to be balanced in
64. In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 64, 286 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1972).
65. Frederick v. District Court, 119 Mont. 143, 155, 173 P.2d 626, 632
(1946) (dissenting opinion).
66. In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 67, 286 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1972).
67. Some courts have maintained that the stature of the adoption process
should be foremost in the construction of a statute. In re Adoption of Mori-
arty, 260 Iowa 1279 1286, 152 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1967); Lutheran Social Serv.
Inc. v. Farris, 483 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
68. Wilson v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 318, 383 P.2d 925, 926 (1963).
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the ultimate determination of the child's best interests. 69 In defer-
ence to the agency, agency determinations could be given presump-
tive force-so long as the presumption remained rebuttable. This
approach is proper for a number of reasons. Since the parents are
attacking an administrative decision, it is reasonable that they
should be compelled to prove the nature of the agency's errorY'
Also, it is inappropriate to place the agency on the defensive when
it is, in fact, considered expert in the matter and often paid by the
state for its expertise. Since it it is a valuable resource, its opinions
should be given considerable weight.71
The best-interests approach, then, is the antagonist of a no-re-
view policy; best-interests all but dictates that adoption agency de-
terminations be reviewable and that the agency's judgment of the
best interests become merely a factor in the ultimate decision of
the court. Because it ensures a balanced resolution of the issue of
what steps best promote the child's welfare, the tendency of the
courts and legislatures to favor the best-interests approach is in-
creasing.
In most cases, the progress of the best-interests approach has
been incremental. In one state only persistent legislative efforts
have elevated the best-interests approach over the need for agency
consent. In Wisconsin the original adoption statute was silent on
the issue of the need for judicial review.72
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Tschudy7 3
had taken the position that agency consent was absolutely essen-
69. In re Hann, 31 Ohio App. 63, 286 N.E.2d 478 (1972).
70. In Washington, for example, a statute that expressly mandates a best-
interests approach, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.32.040(3) (1955), has been
interpreted as placing the burden of proof on the adoptive parents to demon-
strate the invalidity of the agency determination. In re Adoption of Reinius,
55 Wash. 2d 117, 123-28, 346 P.2d 672, 675-78 (1959).
71. The court in Department of Welfare v. Jarboe, 464 S.W.2d 287, 291-
92 (Ky. 1971), states that the parties petitioning without the agency's consent
were claiming that
their facts, conclusions and philosophies are correct as opposed to
all the professionals who are in the pay of the state to carry out the
state policy ...
All of the above talent is being paid for by the taxpayers of Ken-
tucky at a cost of many thousands of dollars per month. Its sole
purpose is to aid and direct the lives of children.. . . This court
or no court should thwart or interfere with the activities of these
people without strong cause.
72. Act of June 9, 1947, ch. 218, § 5, [1947] Wis. Laws 301, as amended,
Act of June 16, 1953, ch. 288, § 3, [1953] Wis. Laws 268 (repealed 1955).
73. 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W.2d 17 (1954).
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tial to an adoption petition. A year later, the Wisconsin legisla-
ture amended the statute to permit waiver of consent if the agency's
decision was "arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evi-
dence."'7 4 However, the court's decision in In re Adoption of
Shields75 robbed the new statute of any meaningful effect by hold-
ing that a consideration of the best interests of the child was not
enough; there had to be a finding that the custodian did not have a
bona fide belief that its denial of consent was justifiable. 76 The
Wisconsin legislature swiftly responded in an unmistakable fashion,
amending the statute so that courts would have no alternative but to
undertake review. 77 In 1969 the legislature again amended the
statute to reduce petitioner's burden of proof further changing the
standard required to overcome the agency's decision from a clear
preponderance to a fair preponderance.78 The Wisconsin court did
not ignore the legislature again. The case of In re Adoption of
Tachick79 affirmed that the court would review the factual back-
ground behind the adoption decision and make its own decision
concerning the child's best interests upon agency rejection of a peti-
tion.
In other states, where legislative cues have not been so forceful,
the judiciary has been compelled to set the pace for the use of the
best interests approach. Here, the movement to date has been slow,
but promising. Illustrative of the process in the Minnesota judicial
experience was In re Sherman, 0 where the court initially took the
hardline approach that consent was a prerequisite. A more recent
case, Fleming v. Hurst,81 however, indicates a changing posture of
the Minnesota court. Fleming chose to undertake a review of
agency disapproval, distinguishing Sherman on the basis of the na-
ture of the agency exercising the oversight function. In Sherman a
private agency was involved; in Fleming the consent of the Commis-
sioner of Child Welfare was at issue. This distinction may have
been a strained one, but it did indicate that the Minnesota court
was no longer comfortable with agencies possessing complete con-
74. The 1955 revision of the law created § 48.85 to deal with the issue
of guardian disapproval. Act of Aug. 4, 1955, ch. 575, § 7, [1955] Wis. Laws
748 (repealed 1959).
75. 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
76. Id. at 224, 89 N.W.2d at 830.
77. Act of Aug. 14, 1959, cl. 306, § 18, [1959] Wis. Laws 363.
78. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.85 (Ctm. Supp. 1974).
79. 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
80. 241 Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 573 (1954).
81. 271 Minn. 337, 196 N.W.2d 109 (1965).
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trol of the, adoption process.
The movement has not all been in one direction, however. Al-
though the best-interests-of-the-child approach seems to be both
practical and popular, it is by no means universally accepted. The
Uniform Adoption Act, for instance, on its face requires consent.82
Certain state statutes83 continue to require agency consent. The
justifications offered by those who hold out against the trend of ju-
dicial review are diverse. Some writers maintain that in order to
preserve stability in the adoption process agency decisions should not
be overturned,84 a number of courts continue to use the reasoning
of in loco parentis and strict construction.8 5
III. THE CAPACITY OF COURTS TO DEAL WITH
ISSUES RAISED BY JUDICIAL REvIEw
A. Agencies as Experts: The Other Side of the Coin
There is a more pervasive question that arises in the issue of ju-
dicial review of agency determinations: Do courts possess the
ability to deal with problems raised by the adoption process, spe-
cifically the best interests standard? Some courts have explicitly
stated their reluctance to deal with adoption despite statutory di-
rectives providing for judicial scrutiny of agency decisions based
upon a concern that they could not adequately evaluate the broad
range of factors to be considered. 6 in other decisions, these judicial
fears might have been a tacit justification for abstention.
The main premise of those who view the courts as inherently
incapable of confronting adoption problems is the same argument
that arises in any debate over the relative merits of an adinis-
,trative vis-h-vis judicial forum: -the expertise and familiarity of the
agency with the problems in the area.87 It is undeniable that
82. UNiroIRm ADOPTION ACT § 5.
83. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-120(a) (3) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1972).
84. See, e.g., Note, 49 TExAs L. RPv. 1128 (1971), which admits that giv-
ing agencies the power to give or withhold consent without judicial review
would authorize the agencies to withhold consent arbitrarily, but ultimately
opts for giving that power to the agency in the interest of stabilizing the adop-
tion process.
85. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Matthew, 4 Ore. App. 308, 477 P.2d 235
(1970).
86. See, e.g., Department of Welfare v. Jarboe, 464 S.W.2d 287, 291-92
(Ky. 1971).
87. "The process of arranging adoptions involves knowledge of child de-
velopment, genetics, anthropology, pediatrics, sociology, as well as social work
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adoption agencies, as specialists, are better equipped to handle prob-
lems that normally arise in adoption situations. Agencies possess
the staff and facilities to deal with the complex, emotion-fraught
process. Adoption agencies are able to deal with the problems
and needs of all the parties, the natural and adoptive parents as
well as the child.88 Toward this end, the agencies amass complete
case studies of the prospective parents in order to assure stability
in the child's new environment. The courts, on the other hand,
offer overcrowded dockets and judges who often have at best a
generalized knowledge of the problems involved in adoption. This
charge is not limited to the adoption context; it is a pervasive criti-
cism of the entire judicial structure: "Those observing today's
American legal system or affected by its results seem to be any-
thing but pleased with the way it functions."8 9 It would seem that
any measure that would serve to increase the case load would do a
disservice to the courts and the parties involved. Moreover, general-
ized deficiencies in the judicial system are only part of the prob-
lem. The adoption process must also contend with a system of eco-
nomic priorities that unfailingly relegates the problems of the fam-
ily and of children to a position of "low men on the judicial totem
pole."90 Thus, while it has been strongly suggested that family prob-
lems could be more effectively solved by providing a specialized
court aided by social workers and other support personnel, this ap-
proach has never been given an opportunity to prove itself. Prob-
lems of understaffing represent the greatest obstacle to a meaning-
ful experiment with the concept.91
The expertise of the adoption agency and the potentiality of an
increased workload on the courts is but one side of the story, how-
ever. These are compelling reasons for denying the agencies the
monopoly over decisionmaking power that they seek. The in-
telligent use of capable, trained personnel to reach educated but
detached determinations of what is best for the child is the promise
held out by adoption agencies. Yet this ideal must be reconciled
with reality. Adoption agencies are more than charitable organiza-
methods." E. VARON, RE.SEARCH ON ADOPTION 2 (1964). See notes 70-71 su-
pra and accompanying text.
88. Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of Consent and the
Role of Lawyers, 5 F~mmy L.Q. 405, 414 (1971).
89. Monroe, The Urgent Case for American Law Reform: A Judge's Re-
sponse to a Lawyer's Plea, 19 DEPAu. L. REv. 466 (1970).
90. Polier, Problems Involving Family and Child, 66 COLum. L. Ra'v. 305
(1966).
91. Id.
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tions providing for the welfare of unfortunate children; they are bu-
reaucracies plagued by many of the problems that beset all such
institutions. One of the prevailing faults of any bureaucracy is
that of growing inflexibility, and adoption agencies have not es-
caped this tendency. The problem of inflexibility is particularly
debilitating in the area of adoption. In order to function smoothly,
bureaucracies typically rely on standardized criteria rather than on a
case-by-case approach. When dealing with complete human rela-
tionships this method is inherently undesirable because in individ-
ual situations special needs or special advantages should take abso-
lute precedence in the decisionmaking process. 2 Obviously, the agen-
cies must have some procedures to ensure smooth operations9 3 and
some equality of treatment, but these procedures should be guide-
lines rather than rigid rules.9 4 Significant evidence points to the
conclusion that adoption agencies are often unnecessarily rigid in
making their determinations. A New York study found that the
most frequent criticisms leveled at the agencies accused them of in-
flexibility and overcaution.9 5 Objective evidence has confirmed that
many rules followed by adoption agencies are surplusage. When
an increase in the numbers of available children necessitated a relax-
ation of agency rules, agencies found that what they had consid-
ered qualifications for adoptive parents were no longer crucial to the
child's welfare.9 6 Yet one need only examine the scope of the rules
to see the attempt by agencies to quantify the unquantifiable. Be-
yond the rules that deal with critical issues, such as the mental
health of the prospective parents and the child, there are, among
others, rules as to maximum age limits of the adoptive parents, re-
quirements as to minimum savings, as to minimum numbers of
rooms in the prospective new home,97 and as to ethnic and physical
92. See note 19 supra.
93. CLARK 642.
94. In In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 549, 210 N.W.2d 865,
870 (1973), the court stated that "[a]lIthough many adoptive agencies have
rules of thumb as to age for disqualifying prospective adoptive parents, they
should not be conclusive." The court also concluded that the "[plersonal
qualities of the adoptive parents are of paramount importance; the age, income
and social class are far less important. Id. at 549 n.7, 210 N.E.2d at 870 n.7.
See CLARY 624.
95. FACTS TO BUILD ON-A STUDY OF ADOPTION IN NEW YORK STATE 33
(1962).
96. Hauser, Adoption and Religious Control, 54 A.B.A.J. 771 (1968).
See also CLARY 604-05.
97. Hauser, supra note 96.
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matching.98 These examples do not demonstrate the true nature of
the problem, however. Although the proliferation of rules purports
to establish objective standards of adoptive parent suitability, the
structure of the adoption industry precludes such a result. Each
agency has its own maze of regulations and, more importantly, its
own policies of administrative discretion in construing them. Thus,
the candidate labeled qualified by one agency may be summarily
denied any consideration by another. The existence of the rules,
therefore, presents a dual problem-inflexibility and capricious-
ness. 99
The current status of the adoption process has made a reexam-
ination of these deficiencies imperative. Despite a recent upsurge
in the number of babies,10 0 there are again few children available
for adoption relative to the number of applications, and certain cat-
egories of children, such as white infants are particularly in de-
mand.101 The rush of applications for these desired infants has led
to a continuation of the overly rigid rules, which had begun to dis-
appear when babies were plentiful. 102 The agencies have chosen
adherence to strict rules and regulations as a means of expediting
the handling of applications but at the cost of careful examination
of total human relationships. 'In the absence of judicial scrutiny,
it is unlikely that any conscientious review of existing procedures
will take place within the agencies. Furthermore, arbitrary agency
procedures produce an environment ripe for 'the growth of illegal
techniques, such as extortion, to secure the approval of adoption
petitions. 103
The criticisms levelled at the adoption agencies by both laymen
and agency administrators themselves indicate that agencies
should not be permitted to be self-policing institutions: "There
should be one tribunal in which all points of view can be heard and
weighed. This can only be done by allowing the court to override
agency objection."' 04
98. In re Bonez, 50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Family Ct. 1966).
99. In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 66, 286 N.E.2d 478, 480 (1972).
BRiELAND, AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELECTION OF ADOPTVE PARENTS
AT INTAKE (1959), contained a study of caseworkers' reactions to a taped in-
terview of candidate-parents. The study demonstrated substantial disagreement
about the fitness of the couple.
100. CLARK 604.
101. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
102. Hauser, supra note 96.
103. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
104. CLARK 624-25.
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B. Success of the Courts in Areas Analogous to Adoption
To show the ability of the courts to deal with the complex prob-
lems raised by adoption it is not sufficient to state that the courts
can offer greater detachment than the agencies. Perhaps the
best method of demonstrating that courts are capable to handle adop-
tion problems adequately is to demonstrate the success of the courts
in dealing with issues of a similar nature.
Probation is one area that requires the same weighing of highly
subjective elements as does adoption. 10 5 Most of the information
in the hands of the court in making the final decision is provided by
specially trained personnel. Social workers are deeply involved in
the probation system. After a defendant has been convicted, his
case is assigned to a social worker, who makes a study and sub-
mits a report with recommendations to the judge as to probation or
institutionalization. The caseworker considers a variety of factors
including the crime committed, psychiatric evidence, the past rec-
ord and personality of the individual. The court receives the re-
port and reviews the information presented, and finally deter-
mines whether to imprison or grant probation. The judge's deci-
sion controls.' 06
The suggestion could be made that the social workers are so
expert that they should have sole control of the process but in the
field of probation evidence demonstrates that the social worker is
not infallible. 'In 63.3 percent of the cases where the courts over-
rode the caseworkers' recommendation of imprisonment, the proba-
tions were successful. This compares with only a 73 percent record
of success among those initially recommended for probation by the
social worker.107 These statistics indicate overcaution on the part of
the social workers and suggest that in a significant percentage of
cases the courts' failure to accept the evaluations of the social
workers was justified. The success of probation as a means of re-
habilitating criminals is perhaps questionable, but the record of the
courts in using their independent judgment to deal with marginal
cases compares favorably with the record of those specifically
trained to deal with that particular work.
An area more closely analogous to adoption is the judicial dispo-
sition of custody issues pursuant to divorce decrees. In most cus-
105. See generally PROBATION AND PAROLE: SELECTED READINGS (R. Carter
& L. Wilkins eds. 1970).
106. Kaufman, Sentencing the Judge's Problem, in id., at 158.
107. Carter & Wilkins, Some Factors in Sentencing Policy, in PROBATION
AND PAROLE: SELECTED READINGS 146 (R. Carter & L. Wilkins eds. 1970).
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tody contests the court is dealing with the child's welfare much as
in adoption, albeit on a conditional basis.' 08 The courts displayed
no hesitation in handling these matters, and there is scant authority
that they should not or cannot deal with them. The courts are
the final arbiters of custody matters. Moreover, many statutes di-
rect the courts to make their decisions on the basis of an examina-
tion of the best interests of the child, the preferable test in the res-
olution of adoption issues.10 9
The large number of custody proceedings has given courts ex-
tensive opportunity to exercise their creative talents in framing de-
crees. In Woicek v. Woicek, 0 for example, the court was con-
fronted with a divorce that greatly upset the children involved. The
court's decree resolved the custody issue by splitting the custody and
vacation time between the parents and providing that the children
attend boarding school."'
Of greatest importance in analyzing the ability of courts to re-
view the determinations of adoption agencies is the power of the
courts to grant adoptions directly when the agency does not have
custody. The court itself may have custody, or the natural parents
may retain custody until the adoption proceeding, but in any such
case the role of the agency is limited to making an investigation, re-
port, and recommendation." 2 On the basis of this evidence, along
with any other evidence that the partis may present, the court
makes a final decision on the merits. The court places considerable
reliance on the agency recommendation because of the expertise of
caseworkers. However, since the agency does not have custody, all
the parties may present evidence to the court in the case of an ad-
verse recommendation, and the court is fully informed of the facts
and makes its decision accordingly. Ultimately, the judge has sole
discretion regardless of agency recommendations. The fact that
the judge must apply the nebulous standard of the best interests of the
child does not appear to have been an insurmountable obstacle.
108. In custody matters, the judicial disposition may be regarded as tempo-
rary since the court retains jurisdiction over the parties for the purpose of al-
tering custody arrangements in the event of changed circumstances. E.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
109. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 722.25 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 452.375
(Cum. Supp. 1975); OHio R. C-v. P. 75(P). For an analysis of the role the
courts should play in child custody proceedings, see Note, 25 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 347 (1975).
110. 66 Misc. 2d 357, 321 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
111. The result is applauded in 1 FAMILY LAw CoMmNTAToR 2, 3 (1972).
112. CLARK 634.
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Confidence in the ability of 'the courts to handle these proceed-
ings and the wide experience of the courts in these parallel areas
strongly suggest that the judiciary is well able to cope with the bur-
den of reviewing the decisions of adoption agencies. There is, in
fact, a growing sentiment that courts should undertake an even
greater role in overseeing parent-child relationships as in instances
of abuse or neglect. 113 This, in itself, is evidence of a faith in the
capability of courts to operate effectively in this general area of the
law. The lack of specific expertise in probation and custody pro-
ceedings has not prevented effective judicial treatment of the prob-
lems. The courts use the social workers' reports and recommen-
dations extensively to provide a broader understanding of the is-
sues and facts involved in each case. Unlike the social workers
themselves, the courts are able to evaluate these reports with
greater freedom from rules and accepted procedures and to exam-
ine the subjective factors involved. The opportunity for judicial
scrutiny means that problems are exposed in a second, impartial
forum.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
Theoretically, the most significant questions that are aired in
the judicial forum are those that touch upon rights of constitu-
tional dignity. Thus, perhaps the most persuasive argument for per-
mitting judicial review of adoption agency determinations lies in the
possibility that constitutional rights may be at stake in the adoption
process. Constitutional issues arise on two levels: first, does the
failure to provide judicial review of agency determinations violate
due process; and second, is there a need to provide a forum for
substantive constitutional issues raised by agency determinations in
order to decide whether state or agency regulations create classifica-
tions vulnerable to attack under the free exercise or equal protection
clauses. Since an exhaustive treatment of the constitutional dimen-
sion of the adoption process is beyond the scope of this Note, this
discussion merely raises the constitutional issues in order to indi-
cate the necessity of reevaluating the role of the adoption agencies.
A. State Action
The threshold issue in any claim that a constitutional right has
been violated is whether state action has precipitated the alleged in-
fringement. At the outset, there is no problem in finding state ac-
113. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Battered Child Syn-
drome, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 296, 313-17 (1970).
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tion where an agency has direct ties with formal state operations,
such as departments of welfare. The "formal operation" of a state
agency is deemed to constitute "the most obvious instance" of state
action. 114 On the other hand, there may be a substantial question
whether the operations of private adoption agencies constitute
state action. Private agencies, of course, are not automatically elimi-
nated from consideration under state action. The Supreme Court
in United States v. Guest 15 expressly reserved the possibility that
a nominally private institution could perform activities that consti-
tute state action: "[Tihe involvement of the state need [not] be
either exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has
found state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the
Equal Protection Clause even though the participation of the State
was peripheral .... 1"6
Although there are many avenues to finding state action, four
routes seem to predominate: first, state financing; second, significant
state regulation; third, the performance of a public function by a
private party; and fourth, a weighing of all incidents of state in-
volvement."17 Since it includes the other three, the fourth possibility
is perhaps the most persuasive approach in the adoption agency sit-
uation. First, adoption agencies as charitable organizations qualify
for tax exemption. Though not dispositive of significant state in-
volvement, exempt status does suggest a kind of state financing."18
Second, in terms of significant regulation, the state usually places
many restrictions on the operation of adoption agencies. For in-
stance, the relevant Ohio statute" 19 provides for a yearly evaluation
of the agency's performance, and the Department of Welfare is au-
thorized to inquire into children's care and compliance with the De-
partment rules and regulations.' 20  Third, there is considerable force
114. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1070 (1969).
115. 383 U.S. 745 (1965).
116. Id. at 755.
117. Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1070-71.
118. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456, 462 (D.D.C. 1972),
states the proposition that tax exempt status is equivalent to a government sub-
sidy. The government has granted exemptions to charitable organizations to
encourage their activities because these organizations perform functions the
government might otherwise have to perform. However, tax exempt status
alone is typically insufficient to sustain a claim of state action. See Walz v.
Tax* Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and note particularly the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Brennan, id. at 680. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation,
496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
119. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5103.03 (Page 1970).
120. This indicates a degree of governmental involvement well beyond that
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in the concept that private agencies have been delegated by the state
to perform a public function.121 Although the question is far from
settled, there are indications that the state holds the primary re-
sponsibility for caring for children when the natural parents are
unable to provide a suitable family environment and that private
agencies have become the chosen vehicle for fulfilling this responsi-
bility.122  The involvement of the agencies with functions of child
care other than adoption demonstrates that agency resources are used
to carry out far-ranging welfare services for children. In virtually all
states, the agencies provide investigation reports to the courts when
the agency is not involved in the litigation as a party,123 and the agen-
cies frequently provide continuing care for difficult-to-place children.
In these respects the operations of a private adoption agency closely
parallel the workings of a private hospital, an entity a number of
courts have already identified as a conduit of state action.' 24 A court
taking all of the characteristics of charitable child-placing agencies
into account, therefore, might well conclude that their determinations
constitute state action.' 25
B. Rights Vindicated by Judicial Review
To build a constitutional challenge, it is necessary to relate state
of a mere licensing function, which is not, in all probability, sufficient to trig-
ger the state action theory. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
in which the court held that the mere issuance of a state liquor license to a
private club did not place the activities of that club in the realm of state action.
Accord, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
121. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food -Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). While the Supreme Court has appeared
to take a restrictive view of public function recently in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449
(1974), there is language in Jackson which suggests the Court would be more
receptive to finding state action in the context of adoptions. In declining to
find that a utility performs a public function for state action purposes, Justice
Rehnquist noted, "If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of
some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with
sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one."
95 S. Ct. at 454.
122. See, e.g., In re Bonez, 50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Family
Ct. 1966); notes 5,8-60 supra and accompanying text.
123. CLARK 616-17; see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-105 (1971); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 226.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 31, ch. 578-
8 (Supp. 1974).
124. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192
A.2d 817 (1963); Southwick, Hospital Medical Staff Privileges, 18 DEPAUL L.
REv. 655, 659 (1969); Comment, 39 MINN. L. REV. 567, 568 n.6 (1955).
125. Southwick, supra note 124, at 669.
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action to a specific constitutionally protected right. Courts have
raised the question whether denial of judicial review of agency de-
terminations violates a constitutional right. But the courts have
been unable to articulate fully their vague feelings that constitutional
issues are involved and have, instead, resorted to unspecific refer-
ences to unconstitutional effects flowing from the lack of a process
of judicial review:
If Michigan's adoption statute . . . confers on an agency
the absolute and judicially unreviewable power to decide
who shall enjoy custody of -the child and whether, by whom
and when the child may be adopted, subject only to con-
.firmation by the court, there would arise serious constitu-
tional questions under both due process and equal pro-
tection clauses. 12
In order to pursue a due process attack on an adoption pro-
cedure that does not provide for judicial review, the petitioners for
adoption must establish that they have been deprived of a clearly
defined right by a no-review procedure. There does not appear to
be any constitutional right to custody of the adopted child. How-
ever, since the child lives with the new parents conditionally before
any final action on the adoption petition or pursuant to a foster-
parent arrangement, rights may arise sufficient to fall within the
ambit of due process. To achieve this result courts have typically
attempted to draw an analogy between the right to adopt a child and
traditional property rights.12T According to this view, the rights vest
during the period in which the child lives with the adoptive par-
ents under a conditional placement or foster-parent program:
A realistic appraisal of the situation compels us to recognize
that persons such as respondents who have done what they
have done for this child, must be assumed to have an affec-
tion and attachment for her at least equally important to
property rights. Viewed in this light, there certainly have
intervened 'vested rights' and respondents have in reliance
on representations made, placed themselves in a different
position .... 128
A California court, however, did not feel constrained to draw
this analogy, reasoning that such rights are due constitutional pro-
tection on their own independent of any property implications. 29
126. In re Mark T., 8 'Mich. App. 122, 144, 154 N.W.2d 27, 38 (1967).
127. See, e.g., In re Adoption of D-, 122 Utah, 525, 252 P.2d 223 (1953).
128. Id. at 535-36, 252 P.2d at 229.
129. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123
(Ct. App. 1973).
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This view approaches the final decree of adoption as the natural
result of the bonds that form while the adoptive parents have in-
terim custody.130
Once the applicability of due process protections is established,
the final question becomes whether adoption agency determinations
fulfill due process requirements. Because of the closed nature of
agency operations, it may be doubted whether agency determina-
tions procedures can meet even the initial test of a "fair hear-
ing."' 31 An agency can hardly be "an impartial decision maker."'132
There is no opportunity for the petitioners to present their case "in a
meaningful manner", 33 to have representation of counsel in re-
sponding to the agency's position, 34 or to receive an indication of
the reasons for agency action.' 3 5
At the same time, it should be noted that the exact boundaries
of due process are established by a balancing of private and public
or governmental interests.' 3 6 The right or privilege deprived by
the process must be a significant one; the burdens placed on the
government by the use of a more extended process must not be
unusually onerous. The decision to reject an adoption petition is
unquestionably a critical one; moreover, time is not so essential to
the process that a judicial review would overburden the state, nor
has the state expended any funds up to that point in settling the
matter. To discover the specific demands of due process in an adop-
130. Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parents' most
cherished hopes. The event marks the onset of a close and meaning-
ful relationship. The emotional investment does not await the ulti-
mate decree of adoption. Love and mutual dependence set in ahead
of official cachets administrative or judicial. The placement initi-
ates the "'closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent
and child.'" To characterize enforced removal of the child as a
"grievous loss" is to state the obvious.
Id. at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (footnotes omitted); see also James v. Linden,
[1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH PovERTY L. REP. f 9938, at 11,009 (D.
Conn. 1969).
131. "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
132. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1968).
133. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
134. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1968).
135. See CLARK 641 n.21. The requirement of disclosure of the reasons for
the decision is set forth in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271.
136. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961): "[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action."
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tion situation, one is forced to resort to analogous situations. For-
tunately, the case of Goldberg v. Kelly'8 7 presents a fairly close
parallel. In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that the termina-
tion of public assistance payments without an evidentiary hearing
violated due process. The critical factor in the Goldberg decision,
as in -the adoption situation, is that the determination of the bene-
fits before a hearing strikes at one who may in -reality be eligible
for those benefits. The Court specifically stated the nature of the
proceedings that due process required:
In the present context, these [due process] principles require
that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing
the reasons for a proposed termination and an effective op-
portunity to defend by confronting an adverse witness and
by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.
These rights are important . . . where recipients have
challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or
misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or
policies to the facts of particular cases.
1 38
According to the Goldberg test, then, the failure to provide for judi-
cial review of adoption agency decisions cannot pass constitutional
muster.
C. Equal Protection and Free Exercise of Religion
The failure of the judiciary to review agency determinations is
also objectionable because such a procedure avoids the necessity in
many instances of confronting substantive constitutional issues that
arise in the process of agency consideration of adoption petitions.
Statutes and agency regulations often distinguish among classes of
individuals as to their fitness to be adoptive parents.' 39 Restric-
tions may be based on age, health, and income. In all of these
cases, whether the classification deserves the label "suspect" is not
clear. 1 40 Nor is it clear that the right infringed by the classification,
the adoption of the child, is "fundamental." Finally, the question re-
mains unanswered whether the state interest vindicated by the clas-
sification would be sufficient to sustain the classification against equal
protection attack. Moreover, all of these uncertainties are magnified
137. 397 U.S. 254 (1968).
138. Id. at 267-68.
139. See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text.
140. Age and health classifications have not yet been confronted by the
United States Supreme Court. Wealth has been treated in San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-28 (1972), and assigned an intermediate
position in the Burger Court's equal protection scheme. One can speculate
from the new model that few, if any, classifications will henceforth be labelled
"suspect". See note 141 infra.
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by the changes in the equal protection paradigm of the Supreme
Court. The new sliding scale approach would seem to necessitate
a reevaluation of many equal protection issues. 141
Even in areas where the Court has purportedly delivered defini-
tive decisions, doubts remain. Racial and religious qualifications
are prime examples. Statutes prohibiting interracial adoptions have
consistently been declared unconstitutional. 142 Nonetheless, a num-
ber of states still have statutes -that make race a relevant considera-
tion in the decision to approve or reject a petition. The problem with
such statutes is plain. Agencies are already bound to a for-
midable scheme of regulations. 143 With the shortage of chil-
dren for adoption, 44 agencies might tend to interpret the statutes
as justifying a racially-biased adoption decision. 145 Indeed, there is
a great deal of opposition by adoption agency officials to placing
children across racial lines, even when the alternative is that the
child remain without a family.146 Moreover, there are indications
that the technique of racial matching has stretched far beyond its
logical objectives. The case of In re Bonee 47 is illustrative: "We
have explored the use of an adoptive family from our agency for El-
len, but they .[the caseworkers] felt that although she is socially ap-
pealing and intellectually curious, her darker skin tone would create
conflicts.' 148 Matching statutes, therefore may well be vehicles for
enforcing unconstitutional policies.
Similar problems arise with religious matching. Virtually all
states have statutes requiring religious matching of adoptive parents
141. See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnv. L. REV.
1 (1972).
142. The last such statutes were in Texas and Louisiana. They were de-
clared unconstitutional in In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), and in Compos v. McKeithan, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La.
1972).
143. See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note 4 supra.
145. Nevertheless, if it can be shown that race alone is looked to as a
basis for differentiation (and that all other factors are largely ig-
nored), the argument is tenable that these statutes are, in effect, ap-
plied like those which expressly prohibit interracial adoption, and are
therefore, like them, of doubtful constitutionality.
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and children "whenever practicable." 149  Challenges to these stat-
utes are typically based on the free exercise and establishment of
religion clauses of the first amendment. It is argued that children
from small religious groups would have a difficult time being
adopted, and certainly adoptive parents from such groups or atheis-
tic adoptive parents would find it nearly impossible to adopt a child.
There is also a basis for an equal protection attack. ,By insisting
on a family with an established religion the agencies, and thus the
states, are favoring certain religions over other religions and over
nonreligion.150
It may be argued that religious matching is beneficial to the de-
velopment of the child. This position is defensible when a child
has developed an attachment to a particular creed, but the value of
matching when the child is newborn and incapable of forming intel-
ligent religious attachments is questionable. In all of these situa-
tions, it must be questioned whether judicial abstention is proper. If
these regulations are unconstitutional or unconstitutionally applied,
it is the duty of the court to halt their operation.
V. CONCLUSION
The law on judicial review of adoption agencies is in a state of
flux. There is a consensus that the adoption decision should be
founded on the welfare of the child. However, courts must often
contend with both legislative language that elevates the decisionmak-
ing processes of the agency above the interest of the child and le-
gal fictions that present the adoption agency as the representa-
tive and benefactor of the child. In the resulting interplay of legis-
lative and judicial opinion, the underlying purpose of adoption stat-
utes has in some instances been lost. The expanding influence of
the agencies with the attendant risk of arbitrary actions makes a res-
olution of the issue of judicial review of increasing importance. The
judiciary is the logical arbiter of the final adoption decision. It
possesses the ability to confront the human issues presented by adop-
tion petitions and the competence to adjudicate the constitutional is-
sues that may arise. The interposition of the impartial judicial tri-
bunal assures that the adoption agency will serve its proper function
by assisting the state in reaching equitable decisions on adoption pe-
titions.
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